Total Recall:

Are Privacy Changes Inevitable?

William C. Cheng Computer Science Dept. & IMSC, USC

Leana Golubchik Computer Science Dept. / EE-Systems Dept. / IMSC / ISI, USC

David G. Kay

Donald Bren School of Information and Computer Sciences, UCI

Project URL: http://bourbon.usc.edu/iml/recall/ Internet Multimedia Lab, USC



Total Recall Project at USC

- Continuous recording of personal experiences
 - Personal sensors for data acquisition
 - Data stored on Total Recall servers
 - strong encryption
 - indexing, searching, retrieving, etc.
 - Records a *individual perspective* of his/her world
 - whispers and peeks (things that environmental sensors cannot see, hear, or sense)
 - 🛥 Recall, playback
 - immersive environment, eventually



Total Recall Applications



Health care

- Recall a patient's food intake and recent environments can help discovery of allergies
- Monitoring food intake of diabetics can provide warning signals when appropriate
- Support of elderly and people with disability

Education



Transparent Society vs. Big Brother

- Transparent Society
 - *Total Recall* data can be used in legal proceedings
 - business dealings
 - sexual harassment and rape
 - Easy to prove who said what, if data can be authenticated
 - If everyone is recording, will lead to honesty
- Big Brother
 - Fear that data collected for one purpose will be used for another purpose
 - Privacy, as we know it, will be lost forever
- This talk focuses on privacy issues



The Role of a Technologist




Design and build systems that provide proper *security*, *privacy*, and *integrity mechanisms*



Make sure that these mechanisms can enable a wide variety of policies so that legal/social policy development is not hampered by a paucity of technical alternatives

Without technical flexibility, the inevitable development of technology may result in *poor policy by default*









What is the difference between *Total Recall* and human memory?

- A third party gaining access to *Total Recall* data
 - legal as well as illegal access
- Having the system implies that certain records exist
- Only way to access human memory is through questions
- All these give rise to privacy concerns



Are We Allowed to Record Everything?



It depends...

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
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> different states have different laws w.r.t. audio and video recording

Fundamental principle

- People are entitled to privacy where privacy is their "reasonable expectation"
 - home vs. walking on a public street
 - tourist can record a street scene for private use
 - legally, little difference between that and *Total Recall*
 - until *Total Recall* becomes widely used -- yet unrecognized legally
 - overlapping web of recorded memories -unknown impact





What Can We Do With It?



Security measures to protect against unauthorized 3rd party use

- Legal private use is largely unrestricted
 - Publishing without permission could give rise to liability
- Use by the judicial system
 - The US Fifth Amendment (protection against selfincrimination) would likely not protect Total Recall data
 - similar to bank records and e-mail records
 - In civil lawsuits, even an uninvolved 3rd party can be asked to produce *Total Recall* data
 - once asked, destruction or alteration is illegal
 - Threat of ubiquitous use of RFIDs

National security concerns



Will We See Legal Support?



- In theory, new rules of evidence could be adopted to exclude or limit use of *Total Recall* data
 - But unlikely due to legitimate use of data

Proactive protection is harder to achieve

- Likelihood of protective legislation in advance is low for potential abuse of an as-yet-undeveloped technology
 - reluctance to inhibit the development of rapidly evolving technologies
- By the time any technology has even the smallest commercial foothold, its commercial supporters are likely to oppose any restrictions



Will We See Legal Support? (Cont...)



As it should

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- Systems like Total Recall will be developed before comprehensive policy on private of its recordings
- Changes in nature of privacy are likely inevitable

Vital role still exists for technologists

Designing highly configurable systems with enough technical "hooks" to enable whatever privacy policies are eventually arrived at



Could Technology Help?



Making other users of similar systems invisible

- "Don't record me" preference setting
- Comprehensive inauthenticity could diminish utility of such systems
- Authenticity-bit
 - On if data is original/authentic
 - Off if data is modified
 - o automatic or user directed
 - One-way transition from authentic to modified



Authenticity-bit

Advantages

- Authentic data can be used against other forms of evidence
- If off by default, one *might* have some protection against non-consensual use of recordings in legal proceedings

> But modified data may still be admitted as evidence

- Legal system does not require provable certainly
 - hardly recognizes absolute certainly as a concept
- Legal system provides different levels of required proof
 - beyond a reasonable doubt vs. clear and convincing vs. strength of evidence
- We cannot tell the legal system to ignore information, the legal system will make up its mind, even if the authenticity-bit is off

Authenticity-bit (Cont...)

- Imagined exchange in the paper
 - [...]
 - Probably the court would rule to admit the evidence under current law
- Rules of evidence could change
 - Total Recall records with authenticity-bit off could be made inadmissible explicitly
 - Need to be skeptical on practical and political grounds
 - Authenticity-bit could provide the hooks on which policymakers could hang a legal protection scheme



A Possible Implementation

- Using currently available technology
- > Wearable recording device
 - store data on removable memory card
 - user (Alice) can remove card and edit data
 - data is eventually uploaded to a server when device is connected to the Internet
 - data can sit on the wearable device for days
 - Alice has plenty of time to modify data
 - need to authenticate data
 - can have the wearable device digitally sign every data block it produces
 - but can be problematic -- e.g., Alice drains battery, time-shifts data sequence

— (cont...)



A Possible Implementation (Cont...)




strong encryption, device equipped with a

cryptographic smartcard

- temper-resistant
- contains a *private-key*
- can perform public-key and secret-key cryptography
- o private-key is never exposed
- in order to decrypt something encrypted with the public-key, the corresponding smartcard must be physically present (no copy of the private-key)






Practical Considerations


Poor/unavailable network connectivity


- Alice may trick the device to decrypt the special block to obtain the day key and modify data blocks
- Although Alice is allowed to modify data, must not let Alice *claim authenticity* if data blocks are modified

Only sign occasionally

Create dependencies between data blocks via chaining







Concluding Remarks



We have explored privacy concerns in a legal/social setting, offered a potential technical mechanism (authenticity-bit) to address some of the issues



There are other broader implications of *Total Recall* deployment

- "So, Mr. Jones, you turned your Total Recall off when you met Mr. Smith. What were you trying to hide?"
- Will human memorization becomes less important a skill?
- This is not intended as a definitive solution, but a starting point for future discussions
 - Much is left to consider, but the potential is great and so worth pursuing



Concluding Remarks (Cont...)



We believe that systems like *Total Recall* will get built and will have valuable uses, and will radically change our notions of privacy

- Useful technologies are largely inevitable
- They often bring social changes with them
- And we inevitably both suffer and benefit from their consequences



There is not much preventing collection of a lot of data about someone anyway



Our job is to provide sufficiently flexible systems

